I'm starting to become concerned. In an earlier article, "More About Attitude", I commented on the tragic August 27, 2006 Comair crash in Lexington, KY which was the worst U.S. aviation disaster in recent years. This was the accident in which the crew attempted to depart on the wrong runway, a runway that was closed. I came down pretty hard on the flight crew for not following basic procedures such as checking the airplane heading against the published runway heading and for apparently not using a taxi diagram. As it turns out, the release of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tape also revealed that they violated the "sterile cockpit" rule which requires that no unnecessary conversation is to take place while below 10,000 feet. The crew casually chatted about kids and dogs while taxiing to the wrong runway. My comments concerned a lack of professionalism on the part of this flight crew. I stand by those comments, even though the airline has brought suit against the FAA for not having enough controllers on duty. In my humble opinion, that just makes the airline look very bad for not accepting responsibility for the actions of their negligent flight crew. If they don't accept the responsibility, are they taking sufficient actions to make sure that such a tragedy doesn't happen again? I know that I will not get on a Comair flight until they manage to convince me that they are trying very hard to be safe.
But, I digress. Comair pilots aren't alone in my sights. On October 28, 2006, the crew of a Continental Airlines Boeing 757 narrowly avoided disaster when they were successful in bringing the airplane to a stop after unintentionally landing on a taxiway at Newark. Taxiway Zulu runs parallel with Runway 29. Somehow, they managed to confuse Taxiway Zulu for Runway 29. The ceiling consisted of broken clouds at 7500 feet and 10 miles visibility and it was daylight conditions. Runway 29 is
equipped with high-intensity runway edge lights, centerline lights (CL), and runway end identifier lights (REIL). Runway 29 was also equipped with a precision approach path indicator (PAPI) which was located on the right side of the runway.
All
lighting systems for Runway 29 and Taxiway Zulu were illuminated and operating normally. Now, that's a CVR tape that I really want to hear. I haven't had access yet; I'm working on it. I will speculate that procedures weren't being followed. I've had previous experience with Continental Airlines and I have opted out of flying with them for several years now. This incident certainly didn't do anything to change my mind.
On February 28, 2007, a Shuttle America Embraer ERJ-170 ran off the end of the runway after landing in Cleveland. The first officer was flying an instrument approach and the captain reported that he momentarily lost sight of the runway at 30 feet of altitude. The report doesn't tell us whether or not the first officer also lost sight of the runway, but something doesn't smell right. They continued with the landing, a questionable judgment at best, and managed to run off the end while applying full reverse and maximum braking.
These occurrences are but three of many incidents over the past six months that have raised my eyebrows in regard to pilot professionalism. Are these isolated incidents? I certainly hope so. It would be very sad and very dangerous if we are seeing the leading edge of culture change in the airline industry. It was nearly thirty years ago that Crew Resource Management (CRM) was introduced into the industry and the positive change toward a culture of safety began in earnest.
Airline pilots and airline management personnel have taken a beating since the events of September 11, 2001. They have seen massive furloughs, substantial pay and benefit cuts, unfavorable work rule changes, job-uncertainty, and even loss of earned pension benefits. Any of these cuts could have a demoralizing effect on an individual. Combined they can be psychologically devastating. I sincerely hope that the effects of the industry problems have not weakened the culture of safety that has been so prevalent throughout the industry in recent years.
I would call upon pilots as individuals and as members of pilot groups or unions to do some soul-searching on this matter. I would also call upon airline management, especially training managers, to be on the lookout for the warning signs of flight crew disillusionment and attitude change. Once begun by a few individuals, the watershed of culture change would have catastrophic consequences on aviation safety.
Copyright © 2007 Gene Benson
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