I have enjoyed a great personal benefit from my safety outreach in all the new friends I have met online. I have received numerous emails from pilots who have stories and lessons learned that they are willing to share with others.

So this month I thought I would do something a little different with this "Technical Tidbits" space and include one of those stories. Bob Bready was kind enough to provide his personal story of a flight last winter from Richland, Washington to Salt Lake City, Utah in his Glasair RG that ended with an emergency landing. The article is complete with photos and graphics. To conserve space I have converted it to PDF format. Click here to view or download the article. Click here to email Bob.

Here we are all ready to depart on that long awaited family vacation. Hotel reservations and rental car arrangements are all in place. We have done our flight planning, performance planning, and have completed our preflight inspection. People and baggage are all loaded aboard our single-engine airplane. Everyone is excited as we taxi onto the active runway and apply full power for takeoff.

Even though we have briefed our passengers on having a "sterile cockpit" until we reach a safe altitude, a cheer is heard coming from the rear seats as the wheels leave the ground. What a satisfying feeling to know that all the hard work and sacrifices we have made to provide this unique opportunity to the family is truly being enjoyed. We allow a small smile to come through our "all business" pilot persona.

Wait! What's going on? Something isn't right! We're not climbing! We're losing power! We're coming down! What should I do? I think I'll... No, that won't work! Maybe I can...

Is losing engine power soon after takeoff a terrifying thought? You bet it is. This is not just a theoretical possibility that we instructors talk about. It happens many times each year. Sure, it happens to those "other pilots" who skimp on maintenance, do sloppy preflight inspections, or don't check fuel for contamination. But it also happens to conscientious pilots flying well-maintained airplanes.

So let's assume that we are doing all that is reasonably possible to prevent an engine failure. Let's make sure we take one more step and always, yes always, give a takeoff briefing at least to ourselves. Multiengine pilots have been taught to do this for a very long time, but the practice is not common among pilots of single-engine airplanes. This article will skip multi-engine operations and discuss the takeoff briefing for single-engine operations.

In order to do a proper takeoff briefing we need to study the factors involved in this particular takeoff. Therein lies the main benefit of the takeoff briefing! The takeoff briefing should include an analysis of the wind direction and velocity and what effect it will have on the takeoff. It should include the calculated ground roll and distance required to clear the standard fifty foot obstacle versus runway length and actual obstacles in the departure path. It should include the planned rotation speed given the wind, aircraft loading, etc. A point along the runway should be chosen as an abort point in the event something doesn't seem right during the takeoff run. (Yes, that's how I intended to say that. If something doesn't seem right there's usually a reason for that feeling.) The briefing should include any early turns that may be necessary due to ATC instructions, noise abatement procedures, etc. Individual pilots will choose to include various other items. Finally, it must include a plan for a low altitude engine failure and it might include more than one trigger based on the particular circumstances of this takeoff.

For example, most pilots will agree that an engine failure at less than about one hundred feet of altitude in a typical four or six passenger general aviation airplane is best handled by landing straight ahead. Of course there are exceptions to every rule. Would we continue straight ahead into a large propane tank when a 10 degree turn would put us into small trees? Of course not. But as the altitude increases we enjoy more options. What if the engine quits at 300 feet? Where will we go? Back to the airport? Probably not but there might be an empty field thirty to forty-five degrees off the nose. Our best course of action will depend on the terrain and on our altitude.

So perhaps our takeoff briefing will include pre-made decisions on what to do if the engine quits at less than 100 feet, between 100 feet and 500 feet, between 500 feet and 1000 feet, etc. We can choose our altitude bands depending on our airplane, today's wind and density altitude, and the particular airport environment.

A great tool for learning more about the airport environment is Google Earth. A small program downloaded onto our computer lets us examine, from various angles, the terrain and obstacles around an airport. This can be extremely valuable graphic information when used in conjunction with traditional tools such as the Airport/Facility Directory and other government publications.

So let's make a commitment to include the possibility of an engine failure into our takeoff planning and to verbalize the plan just prior to executing the takeoff. Yes, it's OK to talk to yourself!

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the mistakes of others and perhaps avoid repeating those mistakes. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.

On May 23, 2006, at approximately 6:30 PM local time, a private pilot and his commercial pilot passenger received serious injuries when a Mooney M20E collided with trees and power lines during takeoff and initial climb from a private airstrip in the vicinity of Blacksburg, South Carolina. The following is an excerpt from the NTSB accident report:

The pilot stated he set the airplane up for a short field take off by lowering the flaps to 16-degrees, setting the brakes with the rudder pedals, increasing the engine power to 2,650 rpm and allowing the engine to stabilize. The pilot checked the airplane instruments and gauges and everything was in the green. The pilot released the brakes and started the take off roll. Just before reaching midfield the pilot observed the airport owner watching the take off. The airplane airspeed indicator indicated 45 knots. The pilot gave a "thumbs up" to the airport owner and looked back inside at the airspeed indicator. The indicator still indicated 45 knots and the pilot stated he was expecting it to read 60 knots. The airplane wings were providing a little lift, the nose of the airplane was lowered a little to gain airspeed, and there was no increase in airspeed. The pilot stated the end of the runway was approaching and there was insufficient room for him to abort the take off. As soon as the airplane reached the departure end of the runway the pilot pulled back on the control yoke and the airplane became airborne. The pilot stated he retracted the landing gear over the trees, the airplane rolled right, and he applied left rudder. The nose of the airplane pitched down, he observed trees and power lines and the airplane came to a complete stop. The passenger informed him the airplane was on fire, opened the cabin door and they both exited the airplane.

There was a reason that the airplane did not accelerate properly. The NTSB report raises two possibilities. The recently overhauled engine had been reassembled apparently using incorrect bolts to attach an induction tube. There was some evidence that the induction tube had become separated from the engine prior to the accident causing a partial power loss. There was also some discussion of a possibility that the parking brake had not fully released.

But regardless of why an airplane is not behaving as expected, a pilot should be prepared to abort the takeoff when things aren't going well. Had this pilot thought through a takeoff briefing and decided on an abort point this accident might have been avoided or would at least have been less severe.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff after the airplane failed to achieve adequate airspeed on the takeoff roll for undetermined reasons. This resulted in an abrupt pull up, inadvertent stall, and in flight collision with wires, trees and the ground.

Click here to read the full NTSB accident report.

The past month has seen plenty of discussion of pilot training standards. Much of the discussion was generated by a recent NTSB hearing coinciding with the one-year anniversary of the Colgan Airways crash near Buffalo, NY. Now legislation has been introduced to beef up required training, require an ATP for the person in the right seat, as well as some other measures.

The right seater in this accident was an ATP with more than 2200 hours experience so I'm not sure what that legislation would have accomplished here had it already been in place. I'm all in favor of quality, rigorous training and stringent testing standards. But would better training have prevented this accident. I doubt it. The only possible training omission that I have seen is that the simulator training did not take the pilot to stick pusher during stalls. But the situation should never gotten to stick pusher, stick shaker, or even the stall warning. The problem was that neither occupant of the flight deck was paying attention. they were commiserating about the sorry life of a regional airline pilot in violation of sterile cockpit rules. (No discussion of anything not directly flight related below 10,000 feet.)

This is tragically similar to the Comair accident in Lexington, KY in August 2006 in which the flight crew, again both ATPs, attempted to takeoff on the wrong runway. Again, the crew was not paying attention and not observing the sterile cockpit rule. And let's not forget about the October 2009 incident when the Delta/Northwest Airlines crew who flew well past their destination because they were playing on their laptops rather than monitoring the flight. In October 2006 a Continental Airlines crew landed on a taxiway in Newark rather than the runway at night. In March 2008 Great Lakes Aviation Raytheon 1900D had to make an emergency landing after the crew's "unprofessional behavior" (the NTSB's words) resulted in making a takeoff with an unsecured baggage door which came open. And these are all examples of operation by supposedly professional pilots.

On the general aviation side we have examples of accidents involving taking off with only a few gallons of fuel aboard, landing with very strong tailwinds, airplanes that had not had an annual inspection in eight years, buzzing, scud running, extreme overweight takeoffs, drug impairment and on and on.

I have written articles before on the culture change I have seen in aviation. Maybe I'm just becoming one of those contrary old men who criticizes the new generation and has a less than accurate recollection of the past. I have tried to honestly consider that possibility and I don't think that I am delusional on this issue. The newest Nall Report just out confirms that the commercial fixed-wing accident rate spiked in 2008, reaching its highest level of the past five years. I think that American society as a whole has become less likely to strive for excellence and more likely to accept responsibility. There are certainly many examples of exceptions, but I do not see the general level of professionalism among pilots that I saw twenty years ago. And when I talk of professionalism, I am not considering whether or not a pilot earns a living by flying. I am also not considering the level of certificates and ratings held by a pilot. Professionalism is an attitude and not a certificate or a pay stub.

Over the past few months my safety outreach has put me in touch with many pilots who are dedicated to improving their skill and knowledge. I believe that most pilots who are reading this newsletter fall into that group. But unfortunately, I believe you are in the minority.

So is more training the answer to preventing aviation accidents? More and better training is always a positive thing but until pilots of all levels take their responsibilities seriously more disasters will surely follow.