It seems that we are all a bunch of liars, though in most cases, we haven't intentionally deceived anyone. Probably all general aviation pilots have, at one time or another, made a statement similar to, "Don't worry, these engines are extremely reliable and almost never quit. But even if it does, we can just glide down and land in a field." My study of accidents and incidents indicates that the truth in that is somewhat lacking.

The daily compilation of accident and incidents as reported on the FAA website seldom goes without some variation of, "aircraft force landed in a field" or ("aircraft force landed on a road.") Fortunately, many of these events do not end up in the accident statistics because they result in no injury and little or no damage to the aircraft. Other power-loss events do not end so well and end up with injuries and aircraft damage. This is where I should insert statistics on how many engine failure or power loss events happen every year and the rate of those events per 100,000 flying hours. But, my vast research staff consisting of me, myself, and I, have not been able to find any reliable data. So my unscientific analysis is that there are plenty of these events and we should take note.

I suppose we should also note the difference between an engine failure and loss of engine power. Technically, engine failure is just what the title implies. The engine failed because of a mechanical reason. The crankshaft broke, a cylinder split, a bearing seized, etc. Power loss means that the engine stopped developing power for a reason such as fuel exhaustion, fuel contamination, carburetor ice, etc. The awareness that the engine is no longer developing enough power to sustain flight would not be a welcome realization regardless of the cause. I will use the terms interchangeably in this article.

Again, I don't have statistics, but I know from years of observation, that an engine failure of loss of power in a multiengine airplane is no more likely to end well than it is in a single engine craft. I suppose statistically an airplane with two engines has twice the chance of having an engine failure as does a single engine airplane. The common joke is that a light twin operating on one engine has just enough power to arrive at the accident site. Unfortunately, it's way too frequently not a joke. Many light twins can barely fly on one engine, even when operated correctly.

Many multiengine pilots neglect any sort of recurrent training regarding single-engine operations so the chance of making all the correct inputs for a surprise power loss is small. The loss of power in one of two engines creates a whole different set of problems unless the engines are mounted inline as in the old Cessna Skymaster. If the airplane gets slower than the minimum controllable velocity with one engine pulling for all it's worth and the other one dragging a leg, the airplane will do a rather dramatic maneuver called a Vmc roll. Recovery from this maneuver is highly unlikely at low altitude and questionable for the average pilot even at altitude.

So what to do? First, let's take every precaution to avoid the engine failure or power loss. The winner by a wide stretch in causing power loss is fuel exhaustion. This is followed by carburetor icing and fuel contamination. Other than the elusive water hiding in the fuel system that I have written about before, these are preventable problems. I've written ad-nauseum about fuel exhaustion so I won't beat that horse anymore. Carb icing is also an easy one. Know the conditions that produce carb ice and use the carb heat when appropriate. If in doubt, err on the side of caution. Yes, using the carb heat reduces engine power. Clogging the carburetor with ice reduces the engine power even more.

Second, let's keep the airplane well maintained. If renting, take a close look at the maintenance. Stop by the shop and chat with the techs. See if the manuals are out as they work. Check the inside of the cowlings for oil, chaffed wires, or anything else that looks suspicious. If you're going to pay today's rental prices, I would hold that you are entitled to look at the aircraft and engine log books. But beware that determining whether all airworthiness directives (ADs) have been complied with is virtually impossible for the pilot without maintenance training. I have learned that a signature certifying that certain work has been done, especially when it comes to ADs, is no guarantee. Frankly when I have to fly an unfamiliar airplane maintained by someone I don't know, I look for three things. What is the condition inside the cowling? What is the condition of the tires? And are the aileron hinges loose? Granted, the tires and aileron hinges don't have much to do with the engine, but I have found they are indicators of the overall level of aircraft maintenance.

If you have more control over the maintenance such as being an owner or a partner, or being in a club, then make sure you have quality people working on the airplane and don't skimp on the maintenance. Would any of us shop for a surgeon who is willing to work cheap and just do the minimum to put us back together? Our aviation maintenance technicians can kill us as easily as our surgeons and in a much more spectacular fashion. In fact, our AMTs can let us take the whole family along to our collective demise.

Third, plan for the failed engine or loss of power. Think about it before each takeoff. Consider what to do and where to go if the world gets quiet right after takeoff, at 500 feet, and at 1000 feet. The answer to loss of power right after takeoff is of course to land straight ahead. But the answers at 500 feet and 1000 feet will vary with the terrain off the departure end of the runway. Once above 1000 feet, we may have more options. Frequent evaluation of terrain and wind should be made throughout the flight so that an informed decision can be made if power is lost. And, of course, fly traffic patterns that allow for a power-off glide to the runway whenever possible. Flying IFR or at night? Spend some time during the preflight planning and know what the terrain is like along the route. Remember the old adage about night forced landings. Get down low and turn the landing light on. If you don't like what you see, turn the landing light off. Of course that's not a recommended prodedure, but it serves to illustrate the seriousness of the situation.

Fourth, practice engine-out procedures with a CFI. Never shut down the only engine in flight and don't allow any simulated engine emergencies right after takeoff. (For multiengine airplanes, shutting down an engine rather than just setting it up for zero thrust isn't recommended below 5,000 feet AGL and unless in the immediate vicinity of an airport. There's a good chance it won't restart because of rapid cooling or vapor lock.) Instead, practice putting the single-engine airplane where you want it. Keep in mind that if the engine actually quits and the prop windmills, you will have more drag than with the engine at idle. This will give a poorer glide ratio than can be simulated with a closed throttle. But if the prop stops, such as would happen if the engine seized, then you will have less drag than with the engine running at idle and you will have a better glide ratio. We can't safely and accurately simulate either of those conditions. But we can, unless prohibited by the aircraft manufacturer, become proficient at the forward slip. This is a nearly lost art, even though it is required by the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards. A well executed forward slip gives the pilot precise control of the drag and therefore the glide ratio. The slip makes the precision landing point possible. We simply plan on being a bit high, then use whatever degree of slip is necessary to lose the excess altitude. Find a CFI who is comfortable and proficient at doing slips and go out for some practice.

Perhaps most importantly, fly the airplane. Stalling and spinning while trying to restart the engine or stretch the glide to a good spot will guarantee a bad ending.

So let's do what we can to prevent the sounds of silence from filling the cabin and become as good as we can be at dealing with these kind of emergencies. Let's not be the ones to make the headlines.

Multiengine airplanes fly pretty much like single-engine airplanes till one of the engines quits. That loss of power on one side, particularly shortly after takeoff when power is high, produces lots of yaw and can result in a wild ride unless proper and prompt action is taken. A significant part of a multiengine rating is concerned with dealing with engine failures. Most newly-rated multiengine pilots are spring loaded for the engine failure. But over time, complacency creeps in and the engines are expected to run rather than to fail. There is no recurrent training requirement for engine failures in multiengine airplanes. Many multiengine pilots elect to take their flight reviews in a simple, single-engine airplane. Completing the flight review in any airplane qualifies the pilot all airplanes in which he or she is rated. So, it's not uncommon to have a multiengine rated pilot, flying a sophisticated multiengine airplane regularly, to have the most recent engine-out experience be on the check ride fifteen or twenty years ago.

The pilot of this Beech Travel Air died after experiencing a loss of power on the left engine immediately after takeoff.

According to the NTSB report: "The airplane was observed to yaw to the left immediately after becoming airborne, and climbed no more than 75 feet above ground level while flying with the landing gear extended. Several witnesses reported hearing a sputtering or surging sound from the left engine, and after clearing the roof of a hangar by only 25 feet while flying in a nose-up attitude, the airplane banked to the right then rolled to the left, pitched down, and impacted the ground nearly vertical coming to rest with the empennage elevated approximately 20 degrees past vertical."

Both fuel selectors were found set to the auxiliary tank position contrary to a placard adjacent to both fuel selectors. The left and right auxiliary fuel tanks contained approximately 1/4 and 9.0 gallons respectively, of fuel. No leakage was noted from the left auxiliary or main fuel tanks. Ten gallons and 1/4 gallon of 100 LL fuel respectively were drained from the left and right main fuel tanks. No contamination was noted in any recovered fuel. The loss of power was probably due to the left fuel selector being positioned to a tank that contained very little fuel. Investigation revealed no other reason for the loss of power.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during initial climb resulting in inadvertent stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper positioning of the left fuel selector which resulted in fuel starvation to the left engine.

The pilot, age 67 had about 4500 hours total flight time and had logged just under 3000 hours in multiengine airplanes. He had a current medical certificate and a current flight review. I can't be sure, but it appears that he was completely surprised by the engine failure and at a total loss as to how to deal with it. The airport elevation is just above sea level and the temperature was about 70 degrees Fahrenheit. This airplane, particularly lightly loaded as it was, should have been able to easily climb out and return for a safe landing on one engine had proper procedures been followed.

So in this case, there was no mechanical failure evident. The pilot paid the ultimate price for lack of proficiency.

Click here to read the full accident report.

This accident is a good example of why we need to use quality aircraft maintenance folks upon whom we can depend to do things right. the mechanic replaced all six cylinders on this engine but did not have access to current service bulletins and maintenance manuals from the engine manufacturer. The mechanic torqued the cylinder through bolts to something less than 500 inch-pounds while the factory specified a torque value of between 790 and 810 inch-pounds.

According to the NTSB report: "While in cruise at 6,000 feet, one cylinder in the engine indicated a loss of exhaust gas and cylinder head temperature. Thereafter, an increasingly strong vibration was felt, oil dispersed onto the front windscreen, and all engine power was lost. During the landing flare, the airplane impacted an oak tree, a fence, and a rock outcrop. The number 6 cylinder was observed broken from the engine case."

Fortunately, the pilot received only minor injuries and the passenger was uninjured. The airplane received substantial damage.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The failure of the maintenance personnel to follow the procedures in the TCM maintenance manual and adequately torque the engine through-bolts, which led to the separation of the No. 6 cylinder and the catastrophic failure of the engine.

I can't comment specifically on this mechanic, but it's pretty clear that he failed to comply with good operating practices in a couple of ways. Why was he chosen to work on this airplane's engine? Was it a cost factor? Was he the only maintenance provider on the airport? I don't know, but he clearly was not a good choice.

What about the pilot's execution of the forced landing? His options were pretty limited by what is visible in the photo. Maybe this field was his best option and maybe not, but he kept the airplane under control and lived to tell the tale. That's what really counts.

Click here to read the full accident report.

I frequently get emails containing complaints about the FAA Pilot Proficiency Program (aka Wings). My association with the program as a FAASTeam Lead Representative falsely leads people to believe that I have some input into the program design or implementation. I can state unequivocally that is not the case. I find out about changes to the program in exactly the same way every other pilot does, by reading the email or by stumbling upon a change when navigating the website. I have been critical of the program myself on more than a few occasions.

The fact that the program has some warts won't be disputed by me. But I think everyone who has been with the program since "The Change" from the old FAA Safety Program will agree that the warts are slowly being treated and removed and that the program continues to get better. One big plus is the newly released "User's Guide" that I discussed earlier in this newsletter.

But even with the warts, I firmly believe that the core of the program is solid. If used as intended, it creates a customized recurrent training program for each individual pilot. The operative phrase here is "if used as intended."

I see two areas in which the program is not being used as intended and is therefore not delivering what it was designed to do. The first problem is that far too many pilots are participating only in the academic portion and not the flight portion. I applaud the many pilots who attend seminars, complete online courses and attend webinars. That represents a giant leap ahead of the thousands of pilots who do none of that. But completing the flight portion is also an important element in any recurrent training program. Airline pilots are generally pretty safe and their recurrent training programs include both academics and flight (actually extremely high-fidelity simulator) training. For those readers who can't be convinced to participate in the flight portion of the program, I would ask that the lesson plans at least be downloaded and reviewed. An honest self-assessment of what should be reviewed and how much time has passed since those tasks were visited might raise awareness of a potential problem.

The second problem area is, in my opinion, the result of a regulatory flaw. The Wings Program simply provides an alternative method of complying with the requirement for all pilots to complete a flight review each twenty-four calendar months. The flaw is not in the Wings Program, but in the regulation pertaining to the flight review. A pilot who happens to hold certificates and ratings for several categories and classes of aircraft is allowed to meet the flight review requirements by demonstrating proficiency in any one of those categories and classes. The most common example of this is the pilot who is certificated and rated for both single and multiengine land airplanes, routinely flies a complex, fast multiengine airplane such as a Baron, but elects to rent a Cessna 152 for the flight review. That pilot probably never practices simulated engine failures, single-engine approaches, Vmc demonstrations or anything else related to flying a complex, fast, multiengine airplane. He or she is not called upon to demonstrate proficiency until an engine fails on takeoff or in hard instrument conditions. The passing grade is to live and the failing grade is to die.

The Wings Program is bound to follow the same regulatory requirement as the flight review, so the pilot profile can be set up for the category and class of aircraft desired. The same pilot described above can set his or her profile to indicate "airplane, single-engine, land." The program will create a recurrent training program based on those parameters rather than the kind of flying that the pilot actually does. This is fine if the multiengine rated pilot is only flying single-engine airplanes which is often the case. But setting up the program only with regard to the easiest or cheapest way to meet the requirements defeats the purpose of the program and greatly dilutes its benefits.

If not doing so already, give the complete Wings Program a chance to help you become an old pilot.